I spoke the other day of the colossal military
disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to
withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they
knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and
on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen
French divisions and threw out of action for the critical period
the whole of the British Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000
French troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk
but only with the loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment.
This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first
two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we
consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against
heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon
the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well
be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and
best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However, General
Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British divisions
or their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their
French comrades. They have suffered severely, but they have fought
well. We sent every man we could to France as fast as we could
re-equip and transport their formations.
I am not reciting these facts for the purpose
of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful.
We cannot afford it. I recite them in order to explain why it
was we did not have, as we could have had, between twelve and
fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great
battle instead of only three. Now I put all this aside. I put
it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have time,
will select their documents to tell their stories. We have to
think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in
a small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would
hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the
Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during
the years which led up to this catastrophe. They seek to indict
those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This
also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too
many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his
speeches. I frequently search mine.
Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel
between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost
the future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions
between Members of the present Government. It was formed at a
moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all sections
of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both
Houses of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together,
and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, we are
going to govern the country and fight the war. It is absolutely
necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each
day to do his duty shall be respected; and their subordinates
must know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are
here today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be
punctually and faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power
we cannot face what lies before us. I should not think it would
be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this
afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not
clear that will be clear in a short time. We are to have a secret
Session on Thursday, and I should think that would be a better
opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which
Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss vital
matters without having everything read the next morning by our
dangerous foes.
The disastrous military events which have happened
during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of
surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I
could to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and
I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France
would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British
Empire to fight on, 'if necessary for years, if necessary alone."
During the last few days we have successfully brought off the
great majority of the troops we had on the line of communication
in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France
since the beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out
of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country. Others are still
fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable success
in their local encounters against the enemy. We have also brought
back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds
which had been accumulated in France during the last nine months.
We have, therefore, in this Island today a very
large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our
best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of thousands
of those who have already measured their quality against the Germans
and found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms at
the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men.
Behind these we have the Local Defense Volunteers, numbering half
a million, only a portion of whom, however, are yet armed with
rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated into our Defense
Forces every man for whom we have a weapon. We expect very large
additions to our weapons in the near future, and in preparation
for this we intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further
large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed
during the vast business of munitions production in all its branches-and
their ramifications are innumerable-will serve their country best
by remaining at their ordinary work until they receive their summons.
We have also over here Dominions armies. The Canadians had actually
landed in France, but have now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed,
but in perfect order, with all their artillery and equipment.
And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will now take
part in the defense of the Mother Country.
Lest the account which I have given of these
large forces should raise the question: Why did they not take
part in the great battle in France? I must make it clear that,
apart from the divisions training and organizing at home, only
12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified
their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to the number which
the French had been led to expect would be available in France
at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our forces at home
have a fighting value for home defense which will, of course,
steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of
Great Britain would at this time require the transportation across
the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and after they
had been so transported they would have to be continually maintained
with all the masses of munitions and supplies which are required
for continuous battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.
Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all,
we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a Navy.
We must remind them For the last thirty years I have been concerned
in discussions about the possibilities of overseas invasion, and
I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning
of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out
of the country. That was a very serious step to take, because
our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained.
Therefore, this Island was for several months particularly denuded
of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time
in their ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that
time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion
of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general
engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a
couple of heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the
Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is to come out
and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they seriously intend
it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor
Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage through the Strait of
Gibraltar in order that he may play the part to which he aspires.
There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find out
whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the last
war or whether they have fallen off at all.
Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne
invasion on a great scale is concerned, we are far more capable
of meeting it today than we were at many periods in the last war
and during the early months of this war, before our other troops
were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now,
the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies
of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across and thrown ashore
at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy morning.
The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern conditions,
depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has to
be of large size, in view of our military strength, to be of any
use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something they
can find and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember
that even five divisions, however lightly equipped, would require
200 to 250 ships, and with modern air reconnaissance and photography
it would not be easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and
conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces to
escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put
it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted long before it
reached the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the
worst blown to pieces with their equipment while they were trying
to land. We also have a great system of minefields, recently strongly
reinforced, through which we alone know the channels. If the enemy
tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the
task of the Navy to destroy the minesweepers and any other forces
employed to protect them. There should be no difficulty in this,
owing to our great superiority at sea.
Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved
arguments on which we have relied during many years in peace and
war. But the question is whether there are any new methods by
which those solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it may
seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty,
whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne
expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when it reaches,
these shores. It would not be a good thing for me to go into details
of this. It might suggest ideas to other people which they have
not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of
their ideas in exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance
and mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because the
enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and
stratagems. The House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity
is being displayed and imagination is being evoked from large
numbers of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly
up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring
vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is being, and must
be, devoted to the subject, because, remember, the enemy is crafty
and there is no dirty trick he will not do.
Some people will ask why, then, was it that the
British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large army
from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions
in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those which
prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the distance,
we could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently,
lying as we did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled
to use only our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive
blockade or interruption which is possible from surface vessels.
Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves,
prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in the North
Sea, on the other hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided
by our submarines, will operate with close and effective air assistance.
This brings me, naturally, to the great question
of invasion from the air, and of the impending struggle between
the British and German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no
invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces to
crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our
Air Force has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there
may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of airborne
soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm reception
both in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition
to continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break
Hitler's air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that
we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most
powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we
have a very powerful Air Force which has proved itself far superior
in quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what
we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which
have been fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at
a considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground
when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were accustomed
to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half
to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man's-land,
we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force, and gained the mastery
of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to one
day after day. Anyone who looks at the photographs which were
published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the
masses of troops assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target
for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation would
not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope
of recovering air superiority at that time and at that place.
In the defence of this Island the advantages
to the defenders will be much greater than they were in the fighting
around Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four
to one which was realised at Dunkirk;
and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which
get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great many injured machines
and men do get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these
will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly soil and
live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines
and their complements will be total losses as far as the war is
concerned.
During the great battle in France, we gave very
powerful and continuous aid to the French Army, both by fighters
and bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would
allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air Force
to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right,
because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been
decisively affected even if we had thrown in our entire fighter
force. That battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening,
by the extraordinary and unforeseen power of the armored columns,
and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers.
Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere
accident in that great struggle, and then we should have found
ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But as
it is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength
is stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who
have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and consequently
we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the
war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced
before. I look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter
pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have
the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and
all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.
There remains, of course, the danger of bombing
attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon us by the
bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber
force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large
bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets
in Germany without intermission. I do not at all underrate the
severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our
countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it,
like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up
to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other
people in the world. Much will depend upon this; every man and
every woman will have the chance to show the finest qualities
of their race, and render the highest service to their cause.
For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our station,
our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the
famous lines: He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable
scene.
I have thought it right upon this occasion to
give the House and the country some indication of the solid, practical
grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue
the war. There are a good many people who say, "Never mind.
Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and
such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them.
But I can assure them that our professional advisers of the three
Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war, and
that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory. We
have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions,
these great communities far beyond the oceans who have been built
up on our laws and on our civilization, and who are absolutely
free to choose their course, but are absolutely devoted to the
ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves inspired by the same
emotions which lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We
have fully consulted them, and I have received from their Prime
Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of Australia,
Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that
wonderful man, with his immense profound mind, and his eye watching
from a distance the whole panorama of European affairs-I have
received from all these eminent men, who all have Governments
behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there because
they represent the will of their people, messages couched in the
most moving terms in which they endorse our decision to fight
on, and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes and to
persevere to the end. That is what we are going to do.
We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our
position worsened since the beginning of the war? It has worsened
by the fact that the Germans have conquered a large part of the
coast line of Western Europe, and many small countries have been
overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air attack
and adds to our naval preoccupation's. It in no way diminishes,
but on the contrary definitely increases, the power of our long-distance
blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war increases
the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst
leak by that. We do not know whether military resistance will
come to an end in France or not, but should it do so, then of
course the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces, both
military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given
to the House these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion
has become more imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved
from the task of maintaining a large army in France, have far
larger and more efficient forces to meet it.
If Hitler can bring under his despotic control
the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add
greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand,
this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense,
continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of
all kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes
and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans coming from
regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers.
I do not see how any of these factors can operate
to our detriment on balance before the winter comes; and the winter
will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe
writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for all their
ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget that
from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was
always possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this
country, together with any other devices of invasion she might
conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to
prevent her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger,
in principle and in a slightly modified form, during all these
months. In the meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved
our methods of defense, and we have learned what we had no right
to assume at the beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft
and the individual British pilot have a sure and definite superiority.
Therefore, in casting up this dread balance sheet and contemplating
our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for intense
vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair.
During the first four years of the last war the
Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment. That
was our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible losses,
frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the end of
those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that
of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another,
and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands into
which they had broken. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves
the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever
to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly,
quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and
we were so glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it
away.
We do not yet know what will happen in France
or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France
and in the French Empire overseas. The French Government will
be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their
future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their
Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release
them. The House will have read the historic declaration in which,
at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have
proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history
to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle. However
matters may go in France
or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we
in this Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense
of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon
to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their
courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share
the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate
nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede.
Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes
to our own. All these shall be restored.
What General Weygand called the Battle of France
is over. I expect that the Battle
of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends
the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own
British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and
our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon
be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in
this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe
may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad,
Sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including
the United States, including all that we have known and cared
for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister,
and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.
Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves
that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand
years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."
